We used event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine the time-course of processing metaphorical and literal sentences in the brain. ERPs were measured to sentence-final (Experiment 1) and mid-sentence (Experiment 2) critical words (CWs) as participants read and made plausibility judgments about familiar nominal metaphors ("A is a B") as well as literal and semantically anomalous sentences of the same form. Unlike the anomalous words, which evoked a robust N400 effect (on the CW in experiments 1 and 2 as well as on the sentence-final word in experiment 2), CWs in the metaphorical, relative to the literal, sentences only evoked an early, localized N400 effect that was over by 400 ms after CW onset, suggesting that, by this time, their metaphorical meaning had been accessed. CWs in the metaphorical sentences also evoked a significantly larger LPC (Late Positive Component) than in the literal sentences. We suggest that this LPC reflected additional analysis that resolved a conflict between the implausibility of the literal sentence interpretation and the match between the metaphorical meaning of the CW, the context and stored information within semantic memory, resulting from early access to both literal and figurative meanings of the CWs.
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Introduction
Metaphors are pervasive in everyday language (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) . They are often used to describe abstract concepts and ideas in a more concrete and vivid way than can be expressed using literal language. For example, in the sentence, "Unemployment is a plague", "plague" is used to describe the abstract or general phenomenon of "things that are unpleasant or likely to cause damage" by likening it to the more concrete concept of disease. The pervasiveness of metaphors, however, does not mean that their processing is straightforward. This is because of their inherently paradoxical nature: they establish a figurative meaning by positing a relation of equality between two relatively dissimilar entities, either explicitly, as in nominal metaphors (metaphors of the type "A is a B", e.g. "That guy is a pig.") or implicitly, as in qualifying metaphors (in which the metaphor is expressed through an adjective or an adverb, e.g. "He was boiling mad"). This means that, if interpreted literally, such sentences do not make sense. The conflict between the literal and the figurative meaning of metaphors poses a challenge to the language comprehension system. This study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to shed light on how this challenge is met at a neural level during word-by-word comprehension of familiar nominal metaphors.
A variety of neurocognitive models have been proposed to describe the processing of metaphors. The original standard pragmatic or hierarchical model (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979 ) makes two claims: first, that processing is serial, such that the literal meaning of a metaphorical sentence (for example, "Unemployment is a plague" meaning. "Unemployment is an epidemic disease with high mortality") is first computed; this literal meaning is perceived as ill-formed, and this leads to a search for the metaphorical meaning of the utterance (henceforth referred to as the 'serial processing claim'). Second, this model views metaphors as deviations from normal language, and therefore assumes that metaphor comprehension requires mechanisms that are qualitatively different from those used for literal sentence processing (henceforth referred to as the 'specialness claim').
At the other end of the continuum, the direct access model (Gibbs, 2002; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989) holds that the metaphorical meaning of a sentence (e.g. "Unemployment is a plague" meaning "Unemployment is unpleasant or likely to cause damage") is directly accessed, without the literal meaning of the whole sen-
